Pursuant to Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the Law, the CNDH is composed of 27 members. 14 members hold voting rights and the 13 others without voting rights include two members of Parliament, two advisers from the Presidency and Prime Ministry, four qualified personalities chosen by the Head of State, and four representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Interior, Social Affairs and human rights Directorate, representing nearly half of the institution’s membership.
The CNDH clarifies that this structure aims to strike a balance between institutional independence and dialogue with public authorities. It also notes that, following previous recommendations, voting rights were removed from political representatives.
However, the SCA remains concerned that the high number of State representatives may impact on the actual and perceived independence of the CNDH, as well as its ability to prevent conflicts of interest.
Government representatives and members of parliament should not be members of, nor participate in, the decision-making of organs of an NHRI. The SCA recognizes that it is important to maintain effective working relationships, and where relevant, to consult with government. However, this should not be achieved through the participation of government representatives in the decision-making body of the NHRI to guarantee its independence.
The SCA therefore encourages the CNDH to advocate for the necessary amendments to its legal framework to significantly reduce or remove the number of State representatives within its decision-making body and introduce additional safeguards limiting their involvement in deliberations and strategic decisions.
The SCA further encourages the CNDH to develop further binding guidance with respect to what constitutes a conflict of interest and the process by which a determination would be made about the existence of such a conflict.
The SCA refers to Paris Principles B.1, B.2, B.3 and C(a), and to its General Observation 1.9 on ‘Political representatives on NHRIs’.